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Abstract
Women have never gained a significant voice in corporate America, holding only 27% of
the board seats on the S&P 500. Recently, an increasing number of Americans have grown to
realize the inequity of this practice, resulting in a rise in female directors. However, this growth
is slow and largely in need of a policy to speed up the process. Gender quotas have garnered the
most attention, but political limitations make them largely unattainable in the United States. In
order to assess viable alternatives, this thesis assembles a database on corporate practices and
uses statistical models to predict what policies and suggestions will best suit the United States.
The models indicate that a mix of policies which indirectly and incrementally increase gender
parity will work best in the context of American politics. Although these policies are arguably
less efficient than quotas, they are feasible alternatives that will help women attain a greater
voice in corporate America.
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Introduction
Women are drastically underrepresented in positions of power and prominence in the
United States, preventing the nation from achieving the equality it claims to provide. Despite
making up over 50% of the United States population, women hold only 27% of board seats in the
S&P 500.1 Measures to increase female representation have historically been viewed
unfavorably, with critics claiming that it is “undemocratic” to force gender equity through policy
initiatives. However, this view is slowly dissipating as people are realizing that the existing
underrepresentation of a large section of the population is un-democratic. Most Americans
indicate support for increasing female representation; a study by the Pew Research Center found
that 59% of Americans think that there are too few women in top executive business positions
(Horowitz, 2018). Public opinion is, therefore, increasingly supportive of gender equity
initiatives, likely fueled in part by the 2017 Me Too Movement. Businesses have likewise
become more receptive to gender equity, though this is arguably fueled by potential profit rather
than democratic notions of fairness. Regardless of the reasons, gender equity on corporate boards
is gaining more traction, but actual progress is slow and largely in need of the help of a policy.
Policy initiatives to increase gender equity traditionally focus on corporate quotas. By
requiring companies to have a certain percentage of women on their boards, quotas are arguably
the most effective and efficient policy solution. However, quotas directly clash with the
American ideal of a limited government, making quotas largely unlikely as a policy solution for
most of America. Instead, policies that indirectly and incrementally increase gender equity are
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“Board member” and “director” are synonymous terms and I will use them interchangeably in this thesis.
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better suited for American government, as well as policy suggestions that are not necessarily
mandates.
Although gender equity is a broad academic field with many research programs, there are
only a few studies that discuss viable alternatives for quotas. Analyzing corporate practices and
policies is therefore crucial in order to understand what policy solutions will most effectively
increase gender equity on corporate boards. Current data on corporations is surprisingly lacking,
resulting in the motivation for this thesis. I have compiled a database with a random sample of
corporations in the S&P 500 and tracked variables I thought may influence gender parity. The
database and the accompanying statistical models provide insight into corporate practices and
allow me to draw relevant inferences from these findings. Using these findings, I am able offer
policy suggestions and corporate solutions that are uniquely suited to increase gender parity
within the context of American politics.
In Chapter 1, the rationale for gender equity is discussed in relation to both corporations
and workers. Several studies indicate that gender diversity has tangible benefits, indicating that
diversity has relevancy beyond that of democratic notions of fairness. These benefits are then
compared to legislative diversity efforts given that there is a more robust literature on the topic.
Finally, the necessity for policy intervention is discussed. Gender diversity efforts have become
politically favorable but are extremely slow, indicating that new policies are needed to drive
faster change.
Chapter 2 is an analysis of gender quotas. Quotas are the primary policy solution
discussed in both the domestic and international literature on gender parity. Several countries
have passed corporate quotas within the last few years, though they are considerably less
widespread than legislative quotas. California is the first and only state to pass quotas in the
7

United States. Although quotas are mostly effective, they are considered to be politically
infeasible for most of America. Quotas interfere with the American ideal of a free market,
rendering them improbable within the context of American politics.
Chapter 3 details the compilation of a unique database. The S&P 500 is chosen as the
data source because it is a popular index of large, public corporations within the United States.
100 companies were randomly selected from the list and data was compiled in January 2020. The
database includes variables that are thought to impact the gender equity of boards, such as
parental leave and term limits. These variables are then analyzed to find basic statistical
relationships.
In Chapter 4, I build several regression models in an effort to test the data. This helps
clarify the relationships found in the previous chapter and gives an indication of statistical
significance. Three models are presented, each utilizing a different dependent variable. In Model
1, the dependent variable is the percentage of female directors. Policies meant to purposely
increase gender diversity, such as mandatory retirement policies and board diversity statements,
are not effective. However, the longevity of female directors, the number of female executives,
and the type of industry all significantly impact the likelihood of women serving on a board. In
Models 2 and 3, the dependent variables are parental leave and parent friendly policies,
respectively. However, these models appear to largely lack statistical significance, likely due to
limitations in the data.
I utilize the findings from earlier chapters to propose a series of viable policy solutions in
Chapter 5. The government should implement parental leave, a Rooney Rule, and subsidize
programs for females to pursue male-dominated industries. These policies are becoming
increasingly popular in the United States and will have an easier time passing than quotas.
8

However, these policies are less efficient than quotas, meaning that they will increase gender
parity at a slower rate. To compensate for a slower change, corporations can also implement
private policies. Company initiated gender quotas are encouraged as well as mentoring programs
and term limits. These policies are too restrictive to be passed as a government mandate but are
nevertheless effective ways to increase female directors. Non-traditional policy avenues, such as
tax incentives, are also a viable alternative.
Achieving gender parity on boards is therefore a valuable goal but burdened by
seemingly complex solutions. There is not a single policy that both efficiently solves the problem
and is considered politically feasible. However, instituting a mix of policies will encourage
boards to add female directors at a faster rate. Women have been underrepresented on boards for
far too long. This thesis aims to give policymakers and corporations policy suggestions that they
can implement to give women a broader voice in corporate America.
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Chapter 1:
Rationale for Gender Equity
Gender equity has increasingly become a salient issue to most Americans. 54% of
Americans think that gender discrimination is a major reason why there are not more women in
top executive business positions (Horowitz, 2018). This increasing support has resulted in an
influx in the number of studies conducted on the topic and has convinced many Americans that
women deserve representation in corporate America. Numerous studies focus on the benefits of
gender equity on corporations, such as improved firm performance (The Bottom Line, 2004; Lee,
2015; Gul, 2011), lower cost acquisitions (Levi, 2014), fewer controversies (Lee, 2015), and
increased support for women in leadership (Elsesser, 2011). Other studies focus more on the
benefits that workers derive, such as more receptive policies aimed at workers’ needs (Bernardi,
2006) and a mentoring effect on other women (Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009). This chapter
will show that when these studies are considered all together, they indicate that gender equitable
boards are largely advantageous for both corporations and workers.
The gender diversity of legislatures is frequently studied and provides a comparison for
corporations. Female politicians are found to have different policy aims than men, indicating a
diversity of ideas when there are more women in government. Women on corporate boards are
likely to act in a similar way and diversify corporate interests. Lastly, this chapter concludes with
the justification for policy intervention. Although the public is increasingly supportive of female
directors, progress is extremely slow. The government must directly interfere to ensure that
women are having their voices heard.

10

Gender Diversity and Corporations
There is currently no federal law mandating gender diversity on corporate boards. 2
Corporations have the sole responsibility of reducing the gender disparity. Support from
corporations is therefore crucial since nothing currently prevents boards from entirely excluding
women. Therefore, it is critical to understand the impact of gender diversity on corporations, as
this can influence how corporations approach gender diversity. This section details the impact of
gender diversity on corporations and concludes that most of the effects are beneficial, thereby
providing a strong incentive for corporations to add more women to their boards.
Profit is arguably the most important consideration in swaying the decisions of firms.
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of women on firm performance and found a positive
benefit (The Bottom Line, 2004; Lee, 2015; Gul, 2011). Evidence shows that companies with
more female representation on top management teams experience better financial performance
than companies with the lowest female representation. For instance, return on equity- which is a
measure of the profitability of a business in relation to equity- is higher on average for
companies with more female board members. One study finds that return on equity is 35.1%
higher for boards with more females and that the total return to shareholders is 34% higher (The
Bottom Line, 2004). A different study estimates that companies with strong female leadership
generate a return on equity of 10.1% per year versus 7.4% for those without strong female
leadership (Lee, 2015). These estimates do differ, likely as a result of a difference in their
research design. Nonetheless, they are still in an overall agreement that greater gender diversity

2

As of 2020, California is the only state to have passed a state corporate quota.
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correlates to better financial outcomes, therefore corroborating the idea that gender has a positive
financial impact.
Another assessment of firm performance is stock prices. One study identified a positive
link between gender diversity on corporate boards and stock price informativeness (Gul, 2011).
Stock price informativeness is the association between stock returns and change in earnings.
Companies with a high informativeness level are more transparent and may entice more people
to invest. The rationale offered in the study regarding gender diversity is that women on
corporate boards are more likely to release voluntary public disclosures. Gul (2011) argues that
more public disclosures are associated with higher stock price informativeness, indicating a
positive link between gender equity and firm performance. However, Gul also finds that gender
diversity is shown to correlate with idiosyncratic volatility, which is essentially investment risk.
This finding potentially undermines the positive impacts of having more women on a board.
However, this study is the only major study to examine gender equity and stock prices, meaning
that it is too soon to conclude anything either way.
Although increasing profit is arguably the biggest incentive to corporations, there are
numerous other non-monetary benefits. For instance, corporations that lack board gender
diversity are more likely to suffer governance-related controversies, such as bribery, corruption,
and fraud (Lee, 2015). Specifically, companies with gender diversity in the bottom quartile
suffered 24% more governance-related controversies between 2012 and 2015. Another benefit of
gender equity is the impact of gender on acquisition costs. Studies show that the presence of
female directors on corporate boards is negatively associated with the firm’s acquisitiveness,
meaning that firms pays less money to acquire assets (Levi, 2015). Women are apparently less
motivated by empire building and make more cautious decisions, thereby making women less
12

likely to destroy shareholder value (Levi, 2015). The tendency of men to be overconfident is
therefore a liability, thus making women more valuable for corporate boards.
Another benefit to female directors is linked to the improvement in gender bias in the
workplace. Historically, female bosses were viewed negatively, which caused difficulties for
women trying to advance in their careers. However, in a nationwide survey conducted in 2011,
scholars found that 54% of people do not have a gender bias towards their boss (Elsesser, 2011).
While this indicates that many people still have a gender bias, this statistic represents an
improvement from prior years and is part of a decades-long upward trend for women.
Furthermore, Elsesser found evidence that exposure to female bosses is a big driving force in
reducing this bias. This potentially indicates that as corporations have more women on their
boards, the bias against them will decrease.
Female board members are also more likely to see the importance of social issues and to
support the Me Too movement (PwC Study, 2019). This support is critical and influential, as
having a more gender-diverse board can improve a company’s image and legitimacy (Smith,
2018). As evidenced by the results of the 2018 midterms, women’s rights are increasingly
becoming more salient to the American public. Having an all-male board frankly looks bad in the
current political climate, garnering support for policies that increase female representation.
Gender Diversity and Workers
In addition to corporate benefits, there are numerous advantages of gender diverse boards
that help workers. For instance, boards with more female representation are more receptive to
workers’ needs (Bernardi, 2006). Other studies have found that female leaders serve as mentors
for other women within the corporation, inspiring these women to take on leadership positions
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(Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009; Wang, 2013). These benefits, although less salient to
corporations, have a potentially strong influence on the American public and are detailed in this
section.
A study by Bernardi (2006) examined Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list
and found a link between the degree of women on boards and the firm’s receptiveness to worker
needs. Essentially, firms with a higher representation of women have an “increased commitment
[to] a quality [work] environment”, thus earning the characteristics necessary to establish a spot
on Fortune’s list. Employee perceptions are therefore more positive at companies with more
female board members. As such, the increased presence of women on corporate boards is
correlated to a higher likelihood of guaranteeing a spot on the list. Bernardi speculates that this is
because female board members care more about social responsibility, notably family-oriented
benefits such as day-care assistance and flexible scheduling. This indicates that all workers
derive more benefits when more women are on corporate boards.
Existing literature also indicates that female board members serve as role models and
mentors for other women in the corporation (Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009; Wang, 2013).
Female leaders are shown to have a positive influence on expanding the representation of women
in lower-level positions within the firm (Kurtulus, 2011; Wang, 2013). One study found that the
number of women on corporate boards is positively linked to the number of women in other
leadership positions within the company. This is because low-level women feel “inspired” by the
“huge milestones” taken by the female directors (Terjesen, 2009). Women on boards often
network with other women within the corporation and typically serve as speakers for firm events,
giving lower-level women the opportunity to form role models of their own gender. This enables
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these women to believe that their own success is possible, as they look to the success already
achieved by the women on the board (Terjesen, 2009).
Legislative Comparison
Some benefits to having women in leadership are more evident when examining
legislative rather than corporate literature. This is largely because gender politics has historically
received more attention than the gender composition of corporate boards. While legislative seats
differ from board seats, ultimately, they are both leadership positions. Research indicates that
female politicians impact the priorities and policies of legislatures.
Female politicians are shown to focus on different priorities than men. A recent study on
this found that women are more likely to increase spending on health care and less likely to
increase spending on military defense (Clayton, 2018). Increased female representation can
therefore influence policy to become more “feminized”, shifting the focus away from historically
masculine policy aims (Clayton, 2018). This allows for political priorities to change to areas
favored by “historically marginalized groups” (Clayton, 2018). It is not unlikely then that having
more women on corporate boards will similarly result in a shift in the type of decisions made by
boards. Diversity of opinions is shown to correlate to better firm performance, indicating that
new opinions are favorable for corporations (Clayton, 2018).
Numerous studies indicate that women in government are also more likely to pay
increased attention towards policies that promote women’s rights (Miller, 2016). Women are
more likely to support and advocate for policies such as paid family leave and state subsidized
child-care. These policies directly benefit working mothers and help lessen the burden that
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children often have on women’s careers. It is likely that women on corporate boards will also
advocate for similar policies, thus helping women advance in their careers.
Justification for Policy Intervention
Only a few companies have reached gender parity on their boards, despite the numerous
economic and political benefits linked to gender diversity. Progress is slow at best, making it
clear that legislative action is needed. Numerous studies show that without any policy
intervention, it will still take years to achieve gender equity, despite a positive shift in American
culture towards gender equity initiatives (Lee, 2015; Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Meyer,
2010). However, this shift in culture – while seemingly beneficial to women – has made some
board directors start to resent board diversity initiatives (PWC Study, 2019). Policy intervention
is therefore crucial in order to achieve gender equity on boards and would show a much-needed
commitment by the American government to reduce gender inequality (Franceschet, 2013).
The argument that progress is slow may seem unconvincing given that numerous studies
indicate that female representation is increasing (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Lee, 2015).
For instance, the Alliance for Board Diversity estimates that 15.7% of Fortune 500 boards were
female in 2010 and that this number has grown to 22.5% in 2018 (Alliance for Board Diversity,
2018). Furthermore, major companies, such as Facebook, have recently announced that they are
making gender a priority for new board membership (Price, 2020). Goldman Sachs has taken it a
step farther and recently announced that they will only help companies go public if they have at
least one diverse board member. Goldman has indicated that their preference for diversity is
women (Son, 2020). While these recent initiatives are encouraging, gender parity is still a slow
endeavor. Furthermore, there is a worry that the increase in female directors is a result of a few
women serving on more boards, rather than an actual increase in the number of new women
16

serving on overall boards. A study by MSCI estimates that women will not occupy 30% of board
seats until 2027. This is over 10 years past the initial target set by the Thirty Percent Coalition,
an initiative supported by major institutional investors within the United States to increase board
representation (Lee, 2015). Without policy intervention, change may happen, but it is doubtful
that it will happen anytime soon, nor is it a guarantee.
There are numerous opponents to policies intended to increase female representation.
Meyer (2010), a prominent scholar on policy theory, argues that change will happen irrespective
of policy. In his opinion, it is the “the purposeful, directed, and autonomous behavior” of
individuals that causes change “irrespective of state intervention” (Meyer, 2010, 1-20). A
resistance to policy is surprisingly common in the United States, causing change to typically
occur “almost entirely from private initiatives” (Terjesen 2009, 327). This is in direct contrast to
Europe, in which change is “predominately driven by public policy” (Terjesen 2009, 327).
Americans are therefore primed to oppose policies, especially if the policy is seen as an
overreach of the government into the business sector.
Although policies are opposed in America, they have been proven to successfully
increase female representation in other countries. For instance, countries that invest more in
state-funded childcare have more women on their boards (Grosvold, 2016). Furthermore, certain
gender quotas have been shown to increase female board representation. As such, the state has
the power to play a role in “facilitating market outcomes” that are in the “interest of women”
(Grosvold 2016, 1184).
The current opinions of corporate board members are a large reason that government
intervention is a necessity. According to a study by PwC, while a large majority of board
directors state that gender diversity brings unique perspectives (94%) and enhances board
17

performance (87%), these board members are also simultaneously becoming disillusioned by
diversity mandates (PwC Study, 2019). In 2019, only 38% of board directors said that gender
diversity is very important, a decrease from 2018 in which 46% of board directors agreed on the
high importance of diversity. This is the first time in over five years that this question has had a
decrease in support among board directors. Furthermore, 63% of directors say that investors
“devote too much attention to board gender diversity”, which is a drastic increase from 2018 in
which only 35% of directors felt this way (PwC Study 2019, 14). Board directors therefore seem
to realize the benefits of gender diverse boards but are seemingly tired of the external pressure to
increase it.
The increasing disenchantment by board directors is mostly seen in men. Women overall
still care about gender diversity initiatives. This is unsurprising given that the PwC Study found
that most women (61%) thought that the optimal percentage of female directors was between 4150%, whereas only 41% of men felt the same way (PwC Study, 2019). Female directors are
therefore more likely to support initiatives that decrease the gender disparity, such as policies
that require interviewing female candidates or laws mandating board diversity. Men, however,
are much more likely to think that boards will naturally become more diverse over time, with
76% of men holding this view in comparison to only 33% of women (PwC Study, 2019). This
further highlights the importance of policy intervention, as corporate board directors are mostly
male and thus are less likely to value and implement gender diversity initiatives.
Another reason that gender diversity initiatives are slow is due to a fear of change or a
risk of failure. One study conducted on boards found that CEOs fear adding board members that
are demographically diverse because they are more likely to challenge the CEO (Johnson et al.,
2017). CEOs also tend to hire board members that they already know, because they desire to
18

have a good relationship and to know exactly how the new board member will act. Given that
most CEOs are men, the preference for a “safe” board member is almost always another man.
Female directors are still atypical, and many CEOs appear to have a fear of the unknown. This
fear drives the gender inequity of boards.
Given the slow progress towards gender equitable boards, government intervention is
needed to ensure faster and more reliable progress. By enacting polices that promote female
representation on boards, the government is assuming the role of guarantors, rather than “mere
promoters” of equality (Franceschet, 2013). Governments that enact policies are therefore
showing their willingness to achieve equality and empower women. If left up to corporations to
make these changes, it is predicted to take many years, during which women’s voices will
continue to be underrepresented and drowned out by the overrepresentation of men. In the next
chapter, I will discuss one potential policy solution – gender quotas – as well as its limitations.
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Chapter 2:
Gender Quotas
While the necessity for policy intervention is evident, the right policy solution is much
less certain. A substantial number of studies consider gender quotas. Gender quotas are praised
for their efficiency and effectiveness, yet they are criticized for their artificial manipulation of
diversity. Although California has implemented a quota, it is very unlikely for quotas to gain
momentum in most of America. This chapter will discuss how quotas directly interfere with the
American ideal of a free market, making them largely infeasible.
History of Quotas
While different types of quotas exist, the basic premise involves increasing the number
of women on corporate boards by mandating that a specific percentage must be female. The
severity of penalties enacted for failing to comply and the percentage of female representation
required vary across the countries that have enacted these quotas. Corporate quotas are a
relatively new policy, with Norway enacting the first quota in 2003. Following Norway’s lead,
Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, and Spain have enacted their
own form of corporate quotas.
Corporate quotas are similar yet distinct from legislative quotas. Legislative quotas are
considerably more popular as about half of the countries in the world have implemented some
form of electoral quota. A diverse number of countries have implemented these quotas, ranging
from Rwanda to Sweden. However, the United States is one of the few Western Democracies to
have no legislative quota on either the federal or state level, resulting in the United States
ranking at 100 out of 190 countries in female representation in 2017. Corporate quotas are much
20

rarer and newer than legislative quotas, making some people dismissive of them because of their
novelty. Interestingly, California signed a corporate quota law into place in 2018, becoming the
first and only state in the United States to do so. While a few other states have floated around a
similar policy, not much progress has been made in any other state. Therefore, the success or
failure of California’s law has the potential to greatly impact the future of corporate gender
quotas within the United States.
California’s Quota
California’s quota requires publicly held corporations to have at least one female director
by January 2020. By January 2022, the number of female directors is required to increase based
on a sliding scale of the total number of directors. For instance, companies with six or more
directors are required to have at least three female directors, while companies with five directors
are required to have two. Companies that do not comply with the law are fined $100,000 for their
first offense and $300,000 for repeat offenses (KPMG, 2020).
Although California’s quota is new, it has already had modest effects. As of January
2020, nearly all (96%) of the publicly held companies in California have complied with the quota
by having at least one female director (KPMG, 2020). Additionally, 62% of the newly appointed
women are serving on their first company board (KPMG, 2020). This signifies that the quota is
not significantly contributing to the “over-boarding” problem that is characteristic of corporate
America. “Over-boarding” is the tendency for America’s top corporations to select directors that
already sit on several other corporate boards. This practice is problematic since it reduces the
diversity and inclusiveness of corporate America. When companies overboard women, it means
that they choose women already serving on another board. This means that a small number of
women are serving on several boards, creating a false sense of gender equity. However,
21

California’s quota seems to have successfully increased the overall number of women serving on
boards, thereby diversifying boards to a greater extent.
Although California’s corporate quota law is new, several studies have analyzed the
impacts of quotas in other countries. While many studies proclaim benefits of quotas (Smith,
2018; Wang, 2013; Teigen, 2012; Franceshet, 2012; Caul, 2001; Clayton, 2018) there is just as
many that are apprehensive towards them (Alstott, 2014; Rose, 2007; Grosvold, 2016; Smith,
2018; Matsa, 2013). In the following section, I will discuss these competing findings in more
detail. Ultimately corporate gender quotas, although good in theory, have numerous downsides
for the United States. Legal challenges will present a formidable barrier and cultural norms may
make the policy unlikely to pass. These challenges will unfortunately make gender quotas an
unrealistic policy solution for many states and the federal government, despite California already
passing their own quota.
Impact of Gender Quotas
Although riddled with impracticalities, gender quotas are arguably the fastest solution to
increasing female representation. By mandating that a specific percentage of a board must be
female, gender quotas can achieve fast success in increasing gender equity (Teigen, 2012; Smith,
2018). However, this impact depends largely on how the quota is set up. Norway, for instance,
imposes a harsh penalty for not complying with their quota by effectively shutting down firms
that do not comply. This penalty increased female representation in Norway to the quota’s
minimum of 40% in just one year after the law’s implementation (Teigen, 2012). Spain, in
contrast, has weak penalties for not increasing gender representation and, as a result, little
progress has been made (Terjesen, 2019). Quotas therefore can be useful in increasing female
representation but are evidently limited by the policy that establishes them.
22

Once corporations achieve their intended target under quotas, numerous benefits arise
from having gender equitable boards. One study examined Norway’s gender quota and found
that it has a positive impact on the number of female board chairs and CEOs, indicating a spillover effect to other top leadership positions (Wang, 2013). Other studies on quotas agree with
this effect, indicating the potential that female board members can have on inspiring and
mentoring other women within the corporation (Smith, 2018). However, these impacts, while
positive, are the same for any corporation with high female representation, irrespective if the
gender equity was achieved through a quota or another means. Thus, it is the impact of female
representation, rather than the quota itself, that provides benefits.
Studies that look at the impact of gender quotas on profit are more skeptical of the
benefits of quotas. While the studies on boards with high female representation generally
indicate a positive impact on profit, the studies on quotas indicate otherwise. Some studies argue
that you cannot justify gender quotas on the grounds of economic efficiency, claiming that
evidence suggests neither a positive nor negative effect (Smith, 2018; Rose, 2007). However,
Matsa disagrees and claims that based on her study of Norway, profits decrease after quotas are
implemented. This is primarily because of increased labor costs from fewer layoffs and higher
relative employment (Matsa, 2013). No study has found evidence that gender quotas increase
firm profits in the short-term, which is problematic given that studies on female representation
indicate otherwise, suggesting that there is something specifically about quotas that can
negatively affect profit.
Another critique against gender quotas is that they artificially create gender equity,
resulting in undesirable consequences. Evidence shows that in countries that have gender quotas,
the percentage of female board members has stagnated after it reached the mandated level. In
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Norway, for instance, the mandate was 40% and over ten years after the law’s implementation, it
has not increased beyond that (Seierstad, 2017). This shows that while quotas can increase
female representation, they do not necessarily change how corporations appoint women beyond
the mandate.
Furthermore, some scholars worry that quotas may create a perception that unqualified
women are joining boards (Smith, 2018; Terjesen, 2009). Studies on quotas show that some men
view women as unqualified and less competent to hold leadership positions, especially given
how male-dominated the business sector is (Terjesen, 2009). Some men fear that women
inherently have opposing opinions, which is problematic for any policy that attempts to increase
female representation. However, early results from California indicate that many of the new
women joining boards are highly qualified. Nearly half (46%) of the women hold an executive
level position, including CEO, CFO, and president (KPMG, 2020). Additionally, 76% hold an
advanced degree, further indicating that the newly hired women are qualified and competent to
serve as a director (KPMG, 2020).
Feasibility of Quotas
Although quotas are linked to both positive and negative impacts, arguably the biggest
reason that they will not work is that they directly clash with American culture. Many people
resent quotas, as they are a direct influence of the government into businesses practices.
Unsurprisingly, a study by PwC found that 83% of board directors – including more than 50% of
female directors – oppose laws, such as quotas, that mandate gender diversity (PwC Study,
2019). American businesses idolize the free market and investor choice, meaning that businesses
will be resistant to the state dictating the gender of their boards. Quotas therefore will “sit
uneasily with deeply-held beliefs” about the role of government in regulating businesses (Alstott
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2014, 45). American culture is heavily influenced by the laissez-faire movement, which is a
significant difference from the European countries that have passed gender quotas. Given this
strong resistance to government interference, gender quotas can easily create resentment and less
effective leadership. Some men will inevitably wonder if the females on boards are there because
of their merit or because of their gender. This may cause men to question the legitimacy of
female board members, potentially then causing women on boards to begin doubting their own
self-worth. If such an environment of doubt and resentment is fostered, the effectiveness of
female leadership is effectively undermined.
Quotas can also undermine female leadership if they force social change before a country
is ready for it. Though this does not necessarily apply to America, other countries have had to
deal with the consequences of essentially taking shortcuts to boost female representation. In
Rwanda, for instance, legislative quotas were passed in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide.
Over half of the legislative seats in Rwanda are filled by women – the most of any country in the
world – yet this is merely a “smoke screen” (Filipovic, 2019). Women largely cannot advocate
for policies that go against the status quo, mainly because women are still massively oppressed in
their home life. Men have complete authority over women in social matters, therefore
undermining the impact of the quota. This indicates that for women’s empowerment to be
meaningful and durable, it must be “coupled with strong [social movements]” (Filipovic, 2019).
While the quotas in Rwanda were legislative rather than corporate, it is not a stretch to assume a
similar effect happening with corporate quotas.
Even if American culture was not an issue in passing gender quotas, it is largely unknown
as to whether quotas are even legal. Nothing has been published that definitively says whether
quotas are prohibited by the United States Constitution. Given this uncertainty, scholars estimate
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that the Supreme Court will need to determine the constitutionality of quotas (Alstott, 2014).
California’s passage of quotas and any potential lawsuits will therefore set a precedent for the
remaining states. Former California Governor Jerry Brown even acknowledged the serious legal
concerns when signing the law into place, admitting that the “flaws” may “prove fatal to its
ultimate implementation” (Ortiz, 2018). Furthermore, the California Chamber of Commerce
staunchly opposed the policy, arguing it lacked Constitutional backing. Despite these legal
challenges, Governor Brown implied that the law was nevertheless critical to establishing a
government that cares about women.
At least two lawsuits have been filed regarding California’s quota. The first is filed by the
Pacific Legal Foundation and argues that the law is discriminatory against men. The Foundation
argues that the law violates the Constitution’s equal protection clause by forcing companies to
“discriminate on the basis of sex” (Campbell, 2019). Additionally, the group contends that the
law is condescending towards women, as quotas supposedly assume that women are not capable
of getting board seats without the help of the government (Campbell, 2019). The argument
clearly rests on the assumption that reverse discrimination exists and uses the argument to further
what is undoubtedly a sexist view about the role of women in leadership. The second lawsuit is
filed by Judicial Watch and argues that using the state’s money to enforce the law violates the
California Constitution (Brown, 2019). Although the standing of these lawsuits is yet to be seen,
they nevertheless present a challenge to the legality of quotas. Lawsuits can last for years, during
which other states may become dissuaded about passing their own quota. Even if quotas are
eventually deemed legal, the lengthy legal battle may not be worth it for other states.
While gender quotas are arguably a fast and effective way to increase gender parity, they
are not without their faults. Additionally, they are not a feasible policy solution for the United
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States, given the legal and cultural limitations. Few alternative policy solutions have garnered
attention, likely because the literature focuses too much on quotas to the detriment of other
potential policies. The next chapter compiles a database on corporate practices to provide insight
on the efficiency and feasibility of other potential policy solutions.
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Chapter 3:
Database
The infeasibility of gender quotas means that another policy is needed to achieve board
gender parity. However, alternative policies are rarely assessed in the existing literature. To
overcome this obstacle, I have compiled a database of 100 companies on the S&P 500. The
database tracks the percentage of female directors and includes corporate practices and policies
that are thought to influence gender diversity. The chapter ends with basic summary statistics of
the variables in the database. Some variables, such as retirement ages and diversity policies,
appear to not correlate with the number of female directors. However, many of the remaining
variables do seem to have a correlation. This provides insight into the types of policies that will
be most effective at increasing female representation on boards.
Data Source
There exists no public database about gender equity of corporate boards. A few studies
on the topic, namely the studies sponsored by the Alliance for Board Diversity and Catalyst
Institute, have made databases but only partially release the database to the public. Furthermore,
these databases do not cover many of the important variables needed in my analysis, making
them largely useless for this thesis. For instance, the database in Catalyst’s “Bottom Line Study”
only includes the company’s industry and their gender diversity quartile, which is a ranking selfimposed by Catalyst for the purpose of their study (The Bottom Line, 2004). As such, I have had
to compile my own database, which is included in its entirely in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
The first decision I made for this database regards the companies that are included.
Several indexes exist that classify companies within the United States, such as the Fortune 500,
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S&P 500, Dow Jones, and Russel 1000. Of these indexes, the Fortune 500 and the S&P 500 are
the most widely known and often used in scholarly studies. The Fortune 500 is an annual list that
ranks both publicly and privately held companies by their total revenue. In contrast, the S&P 500
ranks the stock performance of the 500 largest publicly held corporations by market
capitalization. Companies on both indexes are limited to corporations registered in the United
States.
I chose to use the S&P 500 because that index is limited to only publicly held
corporations. Privately held corporations do not issue stock and thus are not required to release
the financial assessment reports like the ones publicly held corporations release. This limits the
amount of publicly known information on privately held corporations, making it difficult to
include them in such a database. Another consideration on limiting the database to only publicly
held corporations is the composition of the executive board. While every corporation-both public
and private- is required to have a board with at least one director, public corporations typically
hold their directors to much higher standards. This is because board members in public
corporations are elected and held accountable by shareholders, whereas private companies
answer only to themselves. Owners of a private company are free to pick their board members in
any way they see fit, meaning that close friends and family are eligible for board positions. This
influences the composition of private boards and makes analyzing these corporations impractical
if they are compared to publicly held corporations.
Publicly held companies are also listed on the stock market, indicating that these
companies are sensitive to how the stock market reacts. The stock market reacts very fast,
meaning that when a company faces a scandal their stock tends to drop almost immediately. This
forces public companies to typically respond to scandals and try to fix them. Private companies,
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however, feel no ill-effects from the stock market and therefore may be less likely to respond to a
scandal. A study conducted on CEO scandals found that in the immediate aftermath of
misconduct, share prices dropped by 3.1%. In over half of the scandals, the board of directors
directly intervened to mitigate the public backlash (Larcker, 2016). They often opted to make
changes to the board structure in response to such scandals (Larcker, 2016). The stock market
therefore effectively holds publicly held corporations to a higher standard of governance, likely
influencing board composition.
California’s quota law also only affects publicly held companies, further making the S&P
500 the best index to use for the database. California’s quota has no effect on privately held
companies, meaning that these companies are not fined if they underrepresent women on their
board of directors. While quotas may not yet be realistic for most American states, it is not
implausible that a select number of progressive states will try to implement a quota within the
next few years. As such, strictly choosing publicly held corporations for the database is the most
sensible course of action.
Compiling the Data
As implied in the name, the S&P 500 is a list of 500 large corporations listed on stock
exchanges in the United States. Although analyzing all 500 companies is ideal, it was not
feasible due to time restraints. The Wall Street Journal compiled a list in 2016 of all the S&P 500
companies and ranked them by the percentage of women on their boards (Lightner et al., 2016).
This list gave me an idea of how many women reside on most boards, but I ultimately could not
use it given that the data was a few years out of date. For instance, in 2016, 11 of these
companies included no female board members but as of July 2019 every company on the S&P
500 has at least one woman on their board (Umoh, 2019). However, the list did identify three
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companies where the board is comprised of over 50% women. These companies are Navient,
Michael Kors, and Tegna. These three companies are included in the database to ensure that
there are at least a few companies with extremely high female representation. An additional 97
companies were picked using a random number generator from the January 2020 S&P 500 list.
These companies are listed in Table 3.1. Given the large sample size (1/5 of the total), the sample
is a good indicator of the entire S&P 500. While this sample does not represent every corporation
within the United States, it is a good indicator of the actions of large, publicly held corporations.
All the data was found through company websites, particularly in the company’s
governance guidelines. In cases where information was vague or unable to be found, this
limitation is noted within the database. Most companies are extremely transparent with their
board members and their board guidelines. However, parental leave policies and family-friendly
policies are much harder to find and often are vaguely discussed on websites in their employee
benefits section. This is undoubtedly the biggest limitation of the database and it is discussed in
more detail later in this chapter.
In addition to the number of women on the board, several other variables are included in
the database. First, I included the type of industry because existing studies have found a
correlation between women in leadership positions and the industry. Notably, Catalyst’s “Bottom
Line Study” uses industry as one of the few variables they track (The Bottom Line, 2004). The
year the existing female board members joined is also included. This was added because
numerous studies show that female board representation has experienced substantial increases
within the last few years (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Lee, 2015). By tracking the years
women joined a board, I can see if this recent trend towards adding women is supported by the
data.
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Table 3.1: The 100 Companies in the Database
Capri

Walmart

Western Digital

PPL Corporation

Navient

ViacomCBS

Host Hotels & Resorts

Fastenal Company

Tegna

SL Green Realty

Carnival Corporation

eBay

Arista Networks

Ameren

CDW Corp.

Merck & Co.

Chipotle

Hologic

American Electric Power

A. O. Smith Corporation

Invesco

Duke Realty

Xilinx Inc.

Southern Company

Zebra Technologies

Lockheed Martin

Atmos Energy Corporation

Whirlpool Corporation

O'Reilly Automotive

Waters Corporation

Cincinnati Financial

Assurant

Leidos Holdings

Citizens Financial Group

DaVita

Tractor Supply Company

Amazon

Facebook Inc.

IPG Photonics Corporation

Genuine Parts Company

General Motors

Linde PLC

LyondellBasell Industries

Intuitive Surgical

Flowserve Corporation

Illumina

Truist Financial

Hess Corporation

Mid-America Apartment

Mondelez International

Tiffany & Co.

Ingersoll-Rand

Fifth Third Bancorp

Freeport-McMoRan

HP Inc.

International Paper

General Mills

NRG Energy

Varian Medical Systems

Xylem

American Airlines

PulteGroup

Accenture

EOG Resources

Visa

Danaher Corporation

W. R. Berkley

Monster Beverage

DXC Technology

F5 Networks

Avery Dennison

Teleflex Incorporated

Eversource Energy

STERIS

Federal Realty Investment

Hilton

Dish Network

Exelon

Equinix

First Republic Bank

D.R. Horton

Newmont

National Oilwell Varco

WEC Energy Group

TJX Companies

FleetCor Technologies

Duke Energy Corporation

Norwegian Cruise Line

Mohawk Industries

Henry Schein

Snap-on Incorporated

Advanced Micro Devices

Tapestry

Humana

Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.

Xerox Holdings

Ameriprise Financial

Campbell Soup Company

Unum Group

Royal Caribbean Cruises
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A few studies show a link between board policies and board composition (Yerger, 2015).
Term limits and retirement policies ensure that new board members are chosen, which may
contribute to more diverse boards. This makes sense logistically, given that it was previously
established that boards are increasingly picking more diverse members. As such, both term limits
and board retirement policies are included as variables in the database. Additionally, every board
of directors releases a policy regarding what characteristics they look for in nominating and
choosing new board members. Although board diversity policies are not the focus of any existing
study, I felt that including this variable may shed some light as to whether having a specific
board diversity policy is correlated with more diverse boards.
The remaining variables that I included are not explicitly related to a corporation’s board
of directors. However, these variables are either linked to high female representation in
leadership or are thought to be a consequence of female leadership. The number of women in
executive positions is included, foremost to contrast to the number of women on the board and to
provide a basis for the remaining variables. The remaining variables are parental leave and other
parental supportive policies. Parental leave and other child-friendly policies are typically used
most widely by women and therefore benefit women the most. As such, these policies may be
correlated to the number of women on corporate boards. It is impossible to tell with my data,
however, if these policies cause more women to join boards or if the women on the boards
implement these policies. Regardless, establishing any relationship between these policies and
board composition is a significant finding in of itself.
Altogether, this database includes nine variables. The intention is to show whether any of
these variables correlate with board gender diversity. Although causation cannot be
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unequivocally demonstrated, the results from my analysis will help inform policies that can
hopefully improve gender equity on corporate boards.
Data Limitations
Given time restrictions, there are several limitations within the database. Ideally, all the
companies of the S&P 500 would be included, rather than the randomly selected sample of 100
companies. Furthermore, some of the concepts that I wanted to measure had to be modified. For
instance, I wanted to track how long every board member served on their board, but this was
eventually limited to just female board members. Modifications such as these are minor and do
not substantially impact my analysis, especially when considered with the existing literature.
Although numerous variables can be tracked regarding board composition and female
oriented policies, my analysis will not be able to demonstrate a definitive causal relationship.
For instance, parental leave policies and high female representative boards are correlated but I
cannot definitively say that boards with more women are causing their companies to have better
parental leave policies. In fact, the opposite may be true: companies with better parental leave
policies may be the cause of their corporate boards including more women. While the direction
of these relationships is unknown, it is nonetheless helpful to know that these correlations exist.
Several of the variables I tracked are not included in any pre-existing study, making my study
uniquely suited to help future researchers understand the relationship between board composition
and corporate policies.
Companies are constantly changing their boards, meaning my database will become
increasingly out of date as time passes. This database was compiled in January 2020 and my
analysis was completed in the spring of 2020. Nonetheless, some companies have already made
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changes to their board in the interim. For instance, I identified that women compose 29% of the
board at Facebook. However, in March 2020 the company added an additional two women to
their board after garnering negative media attention for their board’s low level of gender parity
(Price, 2020). As a result, women now compose 40% of their board, moving Facebook from the
medium range of female representation into the high range. This change, however, is not
reflected in the database. This data limitation, albeit frustrating, is a welcomed change given the
increased number of women serving on boards.
Female Leadership
Female representation on corporate boards has grown in the last few years, generating
hope for gender equity. According to Catalyst, women held 24% of the S&P 500 Board seats in
2018, an improvement from 2010 when women held only 12% (Catalyst, 2018). As of July 2019,
every S&P 500 board contained at least one woman. While this is a seemingly low achievement,
it is consequential when compared to 2009 when 56 S&P 500 boards included no women
(Catalyst, 2018). These findings are important not only for gender equity but also for validating
the findings of this analysis’s database. As of January 2020, S&P 500 boards contained roughly
28% women. Of the companies included in my database, women held seats on every board.
For the purpose of analyzing the data, the companies are broken up into three categories
depending on the level of gender equity. Low female representative boards are classified as
boards containing 19% or less female members. Medium female representative boards contain
20-39% and high female representative boards are 40% and above. Figure 3.1 shows that almost
75% of boards fall within the medium range. Of the remaining companies, 15% have low female
representation and 11% have high female representation.
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Figure 3.1: Female Representation on Boards

Executive Positions
Executive positions are harder to quantify than board seats, given that every company has
their own policy as to what qualifies as an executive. As listed on their company website, some
companies, such as Capri, only have four executives whereas Mid-Atlantic Apartment
Communities lists 34 executives. The term executive is often used interchangeably with highlevel management positions, making it hard to accurately quantify the number of executives each
company has. In compiling the data, I deemed an executive as every person who was listed on a
company’s top management team. This universally includes CEOs and often includes presidents
of departments within the company. Although companies differ in how they classify an
executive, it seems most relevant to quantify executives as the people that the company identifies
as most important rather than using an arbitrary measurement for every company. Many existing
studies focus exclusively on CEOs, which misses many other top-leadership positions within a
company. As such, in the data, executives represent the most important leaders within each
company according to each company’s website.
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Female executives account for roughly 21% of all executives within a company. This
number is noticeably lower than found on corporate boards, indicating that women are struggling
more in executive positions relative to board positions. If the data was limited exclusively to
CEOs, it is likely that number would be even lower. Catalyst found that in 2019 women account
for only 6% of CEOs on S&P 500 boards (Catalyst, 2020). This number is especially troubling
given that CEOs often serve on boards, both for the company they work for and for outside
companies. According to a 2017 Spencer Stuart report, CEOs served on the board for the
company they worked for 49% of the time. Additionally, 37% of CEOs serve on at least one
board outside of their own company (Spencer Stuart, 2017). The lack of female CEOs therefore
appears to aid in the underrepresentation of female board members.
Female representation in executive positions correlates with female representation on
boards. This is partially intuitive given that CEOs and other top executives frequently serve on
boards. Figure 3.2 shows that among companies with high female representative boards, roughly
29% of executives are females whereas for medium representative companies it is 20% and for
low representative companies it is 16%. It is impossible to know whether the greater number of
female representatives on certain boards are driving those companies to hire more females at
executive-level positions or whether more female executives increase female board members. It
could also be some third, confounding factor that causes a company to both hire more executivelevel women and have more women on their boards. Regardless of the direction of this
relationship, it is nonetheless significant that the gender of board members and executives are
correlated.
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Percentage of Female Executives

Figure 3.2 Female Representation in Executive Positions

Female Representation in Boards

Time on Board
Corporations currently seem motivated to increase the number of women on their boards.
Whether this is due to a genuine desire to increase female representation or due to societal
expectations is unknown. However, it is clear that boards are increasingly adding more women,
as evidenced by a 2017 Spencer Stuart report which found that 36% of new board hires are
women. This is almost 10 percentage points higher than the current percentage of women on
boards, indicating a growth in women hires relative to that of the current board gender
composition (Spencer Stuart, 2017). Given this recent growth in women board members, it is
likely that many of the women currently serving on boards were hired within the last few years.
In my database, the average year that women joined a S&P 500 board is 2013. This indicates that
women have served on a board for about 7 years on average.3 Given time limitations I could not

3

Board membership duration is found by using the average year women joined a board and subtracting it from the
year 2020.
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track the average year that men joined the board. However, for comparative purposes, the
Spencer Stuart report found that the average tenure of all directors was over 8 years, which
would then indicate that the average year directors joined a board was 2012 (Spencer Stuart,
2017). On average, women therefore joined boards more recently, thus serving fewer years.
However, we should be cautious about our use of this data because averages are liable to be
skewed by outliers. For instance, the average number of years served by each company’s longest
serving female director is over 12 years, indicating the potentiality for outliers.
The relationship between the year that females joined a board and overall board gender
composition is unknown. Companies with a long history of female board members may have a
stronger commitment to gender parity than companies without a long history of women serving
on their board. However, adding one woman to a board a long time ago does not guarantee that
the company subsequently adds more women. Additionally, societal pressures have resulted in
several companies recently adding more women to their boards, meaning that companies with
high female representation may have only gained gender parity very recently. As a result, there is
no discernable relationship between the average year that women joined boards and the overall
gender parity of the board. This is depicted in Figure 3.3.

Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.3: Average Year Women Joined Boards by Female Representation

Average Year Women Joined the Board
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An arguably more revealing metric is the mode. In the data, 2019 is the year that the
highest number of women joined an executive board. This confirms a previous hypothesis that
many women currently serving on boards joined recently. The next year that the highest number
of women joined a board was 2018 then followed by 2017, further indicating that female board
membership is increasing every year. The years that women joined a board range from 1980 up
to 2020, with considerably fewer women serving on boards in the 1980s and 1990s than today.
However, this data does not include the women who have previously served on a board but have
since retired. As a result, there are undoubtedly women that are unaccounted for in this data,
given retirements. However, female board membership is undeniably increasing. In 2007,
women filled only 19% of open boards seats that year, indicating almost a 20-percentage point
increase in 10 years (Spencer Stuart, 2017). Given this increase, we can reasonably assume that
the limitations in the data are not substantially impacting the analysis.
Industry
While the number of women in leadership positions is increasing, this growth depends
substantially on the type of industry. Evidence shows that women are more likely to progress in
the education or retail industry than they are in technology or construction (McCarthy, 2016).
This disproportionate growth in gender equity has drawn harsh criticisms, particularly for highly
visible technology companies. Apple, for instance, has faced on-going criticisms for their lack of
gender diversity, prompting the company to start releasing annual diversity reports in 2014.
Their 2019 report reveals that only 29% of leaders are females yet this is depicted positively as it
is an increase from previous years (Apple Diversity Report, 2019). A similar trend is seen among
the other technology giants including Amazon, Google, and Facebook. All these companies
proudly make the effort to advertise their gender diversity initiatives, which typically include
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women councils and mentoring programs. These initiatives get a lot of attention from the public
and are thus widely reported in the media.
While the trend for the technology industry to improve their diversity initiatives is
beneficial, it speaks to a larger problem technology companies have with gender equity. The
tendency for the technology industry to underrepresent women is inherently unjust and their
improvements are arguably a result of public pressure rather than a commitment to eradicating
gender discrimination. Male-dominated industries that are less publicized, such as the
construction industry, have made few strides to improve gender diversity. The disparity among
industries is therefore relevant and is in many cases not getting better. Given this relevance,
industry is included as one of the variables in this analysis.
There are numerous ways to categorize industries within the United States. For
simplicity, 10 types of industries were chosen for this analysis. Several of these industries can be
expanded or compressed if desired. The industries are: finance, retail, real estate, technology,
energy/mining, hospitality, manufacturing, media, construction, and health. The depth of what is
included in each industry is detailed in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Figure 3.4 depicts the
frequency of each industry in the data. As depicted in Figure 3.4, manufacturing and technology
are represented the most, with 23% and 19% respectively. In contrast, construction only makes
up 2% of the companies.
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Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.4: Breakdown of the Data by Industry Type

Type of Industry

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 analyze industry type and female representation. Figure 3.5 and Table
3.2 shows the percentage of companies within each industry for each level of female
representation. As depicted in the graph, retail and media companies seem to correlate the most
to high female representative companies. 36% of companies with high female representation are
retail and 18% are media. In contrast, both these industries make up 0% of companies with low
female representation. Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3 depict a similar but slightly different finding. In
Figure 3.6, the total is the industry rather than the breakdown of companies by gender. Figure 3.6
shows that 50% of both retail and media companies have high female representation. This
finding is unsurprising, especially for retail companies. Retail companies are seen as “feminized”
in the sense that their clientele is mostly women. In the database, retail companies with high
female representation include TJX, the parent company for the fashion stores TJ Maxx,
Marshalls, and Home Goods, as well as Capri, the parent company for fashion brands Michael
Kors and Jimmy Choo. Both TJX and Capri are indicative of “feminized” companies and
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fittingly have boards that respectively are 45% and 50% female. Media companies, though not
traditionally feminine, are also more likely to have women on their board. This is likely because
media companies are more likely to experience public backlash for having low gender parity
than other industries. Media companies are inherently public which essentially forces these
companies to add more women to their boards.
Given that the “feminized” retail industry has high female board representation, it is
fitting that the industries of technology, manufacturing, and construction have low female board
representation. These industries are seen as more male dominated. Among companies with low
female representation, 33% are classified as manufacturing companies and 27% are technology
companies, which is shown in Figure 3.5. As indicated before, technology companies have long
been associated with low female representation, validating this finding. Manufacturing is also
unsurprising, given that the US Bureau of Labor Statistics finds that men make up 71% of
manufacturing jobs (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). While only 7% of low female
represented companies are construction, 50% of construction companies are low female
represented companies. This finding is a result of only having two construction companies in the
database and therefore should be considered skeptically given the low sample size.
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Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.5: Female Representation by Industry Type

Type of Industry

Table 3.2: Female Representation by Industry Type

Industry
Finance

High Women Medium Women Low Women
9.09%

16.22%

6.67%

36.36%

5.41%

0.00%

Real Estate

0.00%

5.41%

6.67%

Technology

9.09%

18.92%

26.67%

Energy and Mining

9.09%

14.86%

13.33%

Hospitality

9.09%

5.41%

6.67%

Manufacturing

9.09%

22.97%

33.33%

18.18%

2.70%

0.00%

Construction

0.00%

1.35%

6.67%

Health

0.00%

6.76%

0.00%

Total

100%

100%

100%

Retail

Media
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Type of Industry

Figures 3.6: Female Representation Within Each Industry

Percentage of Companies

Table 3.3: Female Representation Within Each Industry

Industry
Finance

High Women Medium Women Low Women Total
7%

86%

7% 100%

50%

50%

0% 100%

Real Estate

0%

80%

20% 100%

Technology

5%

74%

21% 100%

Energy and Mining

7%

79%

14% 100%

17%

67%

17% 100%

4%

74%

22% 100%

50%

50%

0% 100%

Construction

0%

50%

50% 100%

Health

0%

100%

0% 100%

Retail

Hospitality
Manufacturing
Media
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“Feminized” industries therefore appear more likely to have boards with high female
representation whereas male dominated industries are more likely to have boards with the lowest
female representation. Although this finding is unsurprising, it nonetheless exemplifies the role
sexism plays in gender representation. Equitable female representation seems to be only
acceptable in “feminized” industries, serving to further cement these industries as appropriate for
females and therefore acceptable for female board members. This is a vicious cycle and can often
restrict women to only a select number of industries. Expanding the industries in which females
serve on boards could potentially fix the gender composition of certain industries. Female leaders
serve as mentors for other women, inspiring women to take on leadership positions (Kurtulus,
2011). If there are more female board members in the manufacturing industry, for instance, more
women leaders may emerge within the entire industry. Additionally, there is evidence that
women are more likely to hire other women. A survey conducted exclusively of female
entrepreneurs found that their businesses have workforces that are 66% female, indicating that
women disproportionately hire other women (Lenz et al., 2018). If enough women are hired in
traditionally “masculine” industries, this will help undermine the gender stereotypes associated
with industries and provide women with more career opportunities.
Parental Leave Policies
Women primarily still do the brunt of child raising, which means that parental leave
policies disproportionately impact women. According to the New America report, there is no
gender difference in the need to take family leave and men are only slightly less likely than
women to take leave (Lenhart, 2019). Yet when men do take leave, they take many fewer days
off despite being more likely to hold high-paying jobs that offer paid leave. This disparity in
leave usage is troublesome because a growing body of research argues that the gender pay gap in
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America and in Europe is more accurately described as a childbearing pay gap. Essentially, these
studies have found that women’s earnings experience a sharp decline after the birth of their first
child while men’s earning do not experience any change (Kleven et al., 2018). As a result,
women typically earn 20% less than men during their career (Kleven et al., 2018). However,
women without children are largely unaffected, indicating that it is the act of having and raising
a child that puts women at a career disadvantage rather than merely their gender. Men’s earnings
appear unaffected whether they have a child or not.
Numerous studies indicate that paid parental leave helps lessen the childbearing pay gap.
Despite leave duration increasing with paid parental leave, several studies find that labor force
attachment increases (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). Scholars argue that paid parental leave
allows more mothers to remain employed throughout their pregnancy and, thus, increases job
continuity for new mothers. This enables mothers to return to their previous job, decreasing the
costs associated with finding new employment (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). Short-term
increases in work hours are also predicted for these mothers once they return to work. RossinSlater predicts a 6 to 9% increase in work hours for 1 to 3 years after giving birth, while Baum
predicts an increase of 2.8 hours per week for the first-year post-birth (Rossin-Slater, 2011;
Baum, 2016).
Paid parental leave policies are therefore extremely beneficial to women as they reduce
the unequal burden of child raising that many women face. Given that only seven states in
America currently have a paid parental leave policy, the responsibility for these policies often
falls on companies. As of March 2018, 16% of privately employed workers had access to paid
parental leave through their employer (Donovan, 2019). The companies that offer paid parental
leave are typically large and among the highest grossing companies within the United States.
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Most, if not all, of S&P 500 companies offer some form of paid parental leave. These policies
have become a norm for the biggest companies in the United States, largely due to the
competitive advantage companies with paid parental leave policies get when they seek new
workers.
While a few companies proudly boast of their parental leave policy, most do not make
their policy public knowledge. Several companies will even say that they offer paid parental
leave but will not publicly provide specifics regarding leave duration. This makes it hard, but not
impossible, to analyze the parental leave policies of the S&P 500 companies. The best estimate is
that every company within the S&P 500 offers some form of parental leave, even if it very
limited and short in duration. Of the 100 companies analyzed, every company either listed
parental leave as one of their employee benefits or a third-party website claimed they offered it.
However, given that third-party websites cannot be verified for legitimacy, I have decided to
exclude companies that do not list the specifics of their parental leave policy on their company
website. These companies are listed as N/A in Figure 3.7 and unfortunately make up 65% of the
companies in the database. The lack of knowledge on these companies’ parental leave policies is
therefore a limitation of the data.
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Figure 3.7: Breakdown of Parental Leave

The remaining 35% of companies are almost evenly split in how generous of a parental
leave policy they offer.4 These policies are separated into three categories: six weeks and below,
seven to twelve weeks, and thirteen weeks and up. These ranges were chosen based on existing
state policies. Among the few states that offer paid parental leave, six weeks is a popular policy
duration and is offered in New Jersey and California.5 Twelve weeks is the longest duration
offered by any of the states and is therefore chosen as the cap for the medium level of parental
leave. I considered any policy above 12 weeks as the most generous, given that no state offers
anything in this range. These categories reflect an American standard for paid parental leave, as
international policies are typically much more generous in terms of leave duration. Additionally,
every company that had public information on their parental leave policy offered 100% of the
employee’s pay, which is a rarity among state policies.

4

This data is limited to maternity leave policies. Several companies offer women a more generous policy than
men, but paternity leave policies are not considered in the analysis for the purpose of simplicity.
5
Six weeks was originally offered in CA and NJ, but both states have recently signed laws to increase leave
duration.
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Figure 3.8 analyzes companies’ parental leave policies and the gender representation on
their corporate board. Table A.4 in the Appendix provides a breakdown of which companies fall
into each parental group category. Due to the limitations in the data, “NA” is the most popular
category for parental leave policies regardless of the gender breakdown of the board. However,
companies with low female representative boards are more likely to have policies without any
publicly released info in comparison to medium and high representative companies. Among low
female representative companies, “NA” policies constitute 80% of companies whereas among
medium and high representative companies it is 62% and 64% respectively. Although it is
impossible to know why this disparity exists, it may be that companies with low female
representation offer less generous parental leave policies. Companies with less generous policies
may be less likely to publicly release the specifics of their policy as they know it could
discourage workers from applying.
Figure 3.8 also shows that companies with high female representation appear to have the
most generous parental leave policies whereas companies with the lowest female board
representation have the least generous policies. No company with high female representation
offers a parental leave policy of less than 6 weeks, while on the opposite end, no company with
low female representation offers a policy with more than 12 weeks. Companies with medium
female representation fall between these extremes, further supporting the notion that female
board representation and the generosity of parental leave policies are correlated.
The disproportionate impact of parental leave policies on women means that companies
that offer generous policies are indicating their support for women in the workplace. Generous
parental leave policies may encourage more women to apply to a company. This is especially
critical for industries that traditionally have low female board representation, such as the
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technology sector. Whether boards with more females offer better policies or better policies
result in more female board members is unknown. However, there is a correlation between
parental leave and female representation, making it likely that companies with better parental
leave policies have a work environment that promotes women achievement and leadership.

Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.8: Parental Leave & Female Directors

Type of Parental Leave

Parent Friendly Policies
In addition to parental leave, there are several other policies that alleviate the burden
women face in raising children. Parent friendly policies ease this burden by allowing for
employees to more easily balance work and family life. A popular employee benefit is childcare
services. Companies typically offer this through discounts at local daycare centers or by having
their own onsite daycare service. This eases the burden workers face in paying for childcare
services and helps encourage workers, especially women, to return to the workforce after having
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children. Another benefit some employers offer is flexible schedules. Flexible schedules allow
for workers to schedule their work hours around their family. Companies that offer this benefit
often allow for workers to periodically work from home. Flexible schedules similarly ease the
burden of child raising and increase workforce retention rates for new parents, especially
women.
Figure 3.9 indicates the frequency of parent friendly policies among the companies in the
database. 55% of companies do not list any parent friendly policy on their website. This is
separate from parental leave, meaning that a company may offer parental leave but nothing
beyond that. For instance, 13% of companies that do not have offer parent friendly policies do
offer paid parental leave of at least 7 weeks or more. However, in general, companies that offer
more parental leave appear more likely to offer parent friendly policies as well. As depicted in
Figure 3.10, the percentage of companies offering no parent friendly policy decreases as parental
leave gets more generous. For instance, 60% of companies with a parental leave policy of 6
weeks or below do not offer parent friendly policies as compared to only 18% of companies with
a parental leave policy of at least 13 weeks.
Among the companies that offer a parent friendly policy, the majority offer childcare
services and a small minority offer flexible work schedules. There is an additional 8% of
companies that offer a parent friendly policy that is unique to either one company or to a small
number of companies. These policies are listed under “other” in Figure 3.9 given their low
frequency. Waters Corporation, for instance, offers information and referrals related to children
and other family related needs. Whirlpool provides a service that allows mothers to ship
breastmilk home while traveling for work. These policies are similarly beneficial to parents,
particularly to mothers, but are less common, resulting in the “other” category.
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Figure 3.9: Parent Friendly Policies by Type

Percentage of Companies That Do
Not Offer a Parent Friendly Policy

Figure 3.10: Companies with Parental Leave That Do Not Offer a Parent Friendly Policy

Type of Parental Leave Offered
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Figure 3.11 breaks down parent friendly policies by board representation. Companies
with low female board representation are much more likely to have no parent friendly policy.
80% of companies with low female board equity do not have a policy whereas among companies
with high female board representation only 18% do not have a policy. High female
representative companies correspondingly are more likely to offer both childcare services and
flexible schedules. This indicates that companies with high gender equity on their boards are
more receptive to parents’ needs. This disproportionately benefits women given that women still
undertake the majority of child rearing.
In addition to benefitting women, parent friendly policies benefit both children and
employers. Parent friendly policies typically allow for workers to spend more time with their
children, allowing for parents and children to develop a deeper bond. Children that are given
more attention are then more likely to be healthier and better educated (Samson, 2019).
Additionally, these policies are linked to better workplace productivity, largely because workers
are relieved of stress. Companies with parent friendly policies are also more likely to attract,
motivate, and retain better employees, providing companies with incentives beyond that of
gender to implement parent friendly policies (Samson, 2019).

Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.11: Parent Friendly Policies & Female Directors

Type of Parent Friendly Policy
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Board Diversity Policy
While every company in the United States is required to have a board, there are no
federal stipulations beyond that.6 As such, boards can consider anything they want when picking
members. However, most boards do claim to consider diversity among the characteristics they
consider in their hiring process. Of the companies in the database, 74% have some form of board
diversity policy. While several of these companies claim to not have a formal diversity policy,
they nevertheless list diversity as a characteristic they consider. This is done by companies such
Western Digital, whose policy regarding diversity is stated below:
Although the Board has not established specific diversity guidelines, the Governance
Committee is committed to Board diversity and takes into account the personal
characteristics, experience and skills of current and prospective directors, including
gender, race and ethnicity, to ensure that a broad range of perspectives is represented on
the Board to effectively perform its governance role and oversee the execution of the
Company’s strategy (Western Digital, Corporate Governance Guidelines).
Western Digital’s policy is characteristic of many companies. By stating that their board
does not have a diversity policy, the company theoretically excuses itself from hypocrisy if their
board is not diverse.7 However, the company simultaneously claims a commitment to diversity, a
stance which is politically popular, especially given the recent Me Too Movement. Although
these companies claim to not have a board diversity policy, they are nevertheless included in the

6

The only exception to this is California’s gender quota. As of 2020, no other state has passed a quota, though a
few have considered the possibility.
7
For reference, women make up 37.5% of Western Digital’s board. This means that the company falls within the
medium range for board diversity.
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database as having one, as the language used otherwise indicates that they maintain a
commitment to hiring gender diverse board members.
Unlike the previous variables, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between
gender diverse boards and board diversity policies. As seen in Figure 3.12, high female
representative companies have a board diversity policy 91% of the time, as compared to medium
and low diverse companies which have a policy in 70% and 80% of companies respectively.
Although high female diverse companies have a higher frequency of board diversity policies,
low diverse companies also have a high percentage, which is higher than that of medium diverse
companies. As such, it appears that having a board diversity policy does not correlate to having a
diverse board. These policies are therefore largely superficial and likely imposed by boards
because they know it is the politically correct thing to do. Having a policy and following it are
therefore two very different things.

Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.12: Companies with a Board Diversity Policy

Companies by their Category of Board Gender Diversity
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Retirement Policies and Term Limits
As stated earlier, companies are increasingly hiring more women. As of 2017, 36% of
new board hires were women (Spencer Stuart, 2017). This exceeds the 28% of females currently
serving on boards. While this still is not ideal, new hires are increasingly more diverse and
representative of the entire population. The gender disparity of boards is therefore largely a result
of existing board members, who are overwhelmingly white men. Board retirement policies and
term limits effectively allow for companies to diversify their boards.
As depicted in Figure 3.13, the majority (63%) of companies have either a mandatory
retirement age and/or a term limit. Term limits are rare, with only 5% of companies having them.
All five of the companies with term limits also simultaneously have a retirement age. Walmart is
among the five companies with a term limit, ensuring that their independent directors do not
serve more than 12 years on their board. Their rationale for term limits demonstrates their desire
for diversity and is stated below:
We believe our term limits for independent directors provide discipline around the
director refreshment process. In turn, this process has resulted in a diverse and highly
skilled Board with the right mix of perspectives, experiences, and tenures, which we
believe provides a distinct advantage during this time of rapid change (Walmart, 2019
Shareholders’ Meeting).
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Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.13: Companies with Mandatory Retirements and/or Term Limits

Type of Mandatory Retirement

Retirement policies are much more common among corporations. 30% of companies
make their directors retire before the age of 75 while 28% of corporations have a retirement age
75 or older. Retirement policies range from age 65 (Southern Corporation) up to 78 (O’Reilly
Automotive). Several companies allow limited exceptions for directors to serve after the
retirement age. This practice is common and justified by companies, such as Visa, who explain
that:
[T]he Board may waive this requirement on the recommendation of the Nominating and
Corporate Governance Committee if, in light of all of the circumstances, a director’s
continued service is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders (Visa,
Corporate Governance Guidelines).
Younger retirement ages and term limits should in theory result in higher turnover rates
for boards, allowing for diverse members to fill the vacant seats. Given that the average age of
directors is 63 and many directors serve on boards for decades, retirement and term limit policies
should increase board diversity (Spencer Stuart, 2017). However, this is not what the data
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shows. As seen in Figure 3.14, boards with high female representation are substantially less
likely than boards with lower female representation to have a retirement policy. When high
female representative boards do have a retirement policy, it is almost never over the age of 75. A
retirement policy of 75 or older may largely be ineffective given the increased likelihood that
board members will retire anyway. Nevertheless, the tendency for boards with high female
representation to lack retirement policies indicates that these policies are likely largely
ineffective. On the other hand, term limits seem to potentially correlate with higher gender
representation. 9% of boards with high gender equity have a term limit. By contrast, 5% of
medium representative boards had term limits and not a single low representative board has one.
Given that the average age of a new director is 57, board members who are not term limited can
potentially serve for over two decades, depending on their company’s retirement policy (Spencer
Stuart, 2017). Term limits, especially if kept low, can therefore be more effective in creating
board turnover and, as a result, the opportunity to increase female representation on the board.

Percentage of Companies

Figure 3.14: Mandatory Retirement and Female Representation

Type of Mandatory Retirement
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While term limits may produce greater board diversity, they are a rarity among
companies. Only 5% of the companies in the database have term limits, substantially lower than
the 63% of companies with retirement policies. Many companies indicated the benefits of term
limits but nevertheless decided to not impose them. As stated by General Motors:
[T] term limits could help ensure that there are fresh ideas and viewpoints available to
the Board, they hold the disadvantage of losing the contribution of directors who have
been able to develop, over a period of time, increasing insight into the Company and its
operations and, therefore, provide an increasing contribution to the Board over time. As
an alternative to strict term limits, the Governance Committee considers each director’s
individual performance and contributions annually (General Motor’s, Board Guidelines).
General Motor’s dismissive use of term limits is common among companies, indicating
that companies may value dedication over diversity. Without term limits, however, diversity may
never be given an opportunity on these boards.
Data Summary
Compiling a database of S&P 500 boards allows for an assessment of corporate practices.
By analyzing these practices, I can develop a sense of what policies will best increase female
representation on boards. Retirement policies, for instance, do not seem like a strong contender
based on the data, but policies focused on industry type may work. However, my analysis in this
chapter includes only basic statistics and should be used primarily as a visual representation of
the data. In the next chapter, I use this data in order to run several regressions, allowing for a
more advanced analysis. The results from the next chapter will primarily influence my policy
recommendations in the final chapter.
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Chapter 4:
Regressions
Applying regressions to the data helps clarify the relationships between the variables in
the database. I have three models, each with a different dependent variable. Model 1 shows the
impact of numerous policies on the number of female directors. As predicted in the previous
chapter, retirement policies and board diversity policies are not effective. However, the longevity
of female board members, the number of female executives, and the type of industry all
significantly impact the presence of women on a board. In Models 2 and 3 the dependent
variables are parental leave and parent friendly policies, respectively. These models are almost
entirely statistically insignificant, likely due to limitations in the database. Given data limitations,
the results from Model 1 will primarily shape the policy suggestions in the next chapter.
Variables
This analysis has three regression models, each utilizing a different dependent variable.
The dependent variables are the percentage of women on boards, parental leave policies, and
parent friendly policies. There are several potential independent variables, including mandatory
retirement polices, board diversity policies, the percentage of female executives, longevity of
board membership, and the type of industry. A more detailed explanation of all the variables
used in the regressions are listed below in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 summarizes the regression results
for all three models. A detailed summary of the regression results is available in the Appendix.
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Table 4.1: Variables Included in Regression Models
Variable Name
WomenOnBoard

Description
This is the percentage of women serving on a company’s board of
directors.

Executives

This is the percentage of women serving in executive roles within a
company. An executive is defined as a person holding a top
management position within a company, as indicated by company
websites.

ParentalLeave

This is the number of weeks of parental leave offered to a
company’s employees. Companies that do not explicitly reveal the
specifics of their policy are excluded.

MandatoryRetirement

This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company’s board has a
mandatory retirement policy.

BoardDiversityPolicy

This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company has a board
diversity policy.

ParentFriendlyPolicy

This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company has parent
friendly policies, excluding parental leave.

AverageBoardLength

This is the average number of years that female board members have
served on a board. All female board members currently serving on a
company’s board are included.

LongestBoardLength

This is amount of years that the longest serving female board
member has served on that board. This only includes women
currently serving, meaning that this variable does not necessarily
capture how long females have been allowed to serve on each
company’s board.

WomenIndustry

This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company is in a female
dominated industry. Female dominated industries are retail, media,
and hospitality. These industries were chosen based on the high
number of women on boards within these industries.
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Table 4.2: Summary of Regression Results
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

------

24.7

5.7*

26.2**

-10.8

4.1

Mandatory Retirement

-0.4

------

------

Board Diversity Policy

0.5

------

------

Women Industry

5.2*

3.8

-0.5

Average Board Length

-1.6**

0.5

-0.03

Longest Board Length

0.9***

-0.5

-0.01

Women on Board
Executives

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Model 1: Women on Boards
The percentage of women serving on boards is an obvious choice to use as a dependent
variable. Identifying the policies and practices that correlate to more women on boards is
imperative to understanding how companies can increase female representation. Regression
Model 1 is listed below and is an OLS regression. The dependent variable (Yi) is the percentage
of women on executive boards and there are six independent variables. These variables are
mandatory retirement policies, the percentage of female executives, board diversity policies,
female dominated industries, the average number of years served by female board members, and
the longest number of years served by a current female board member.
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Regression Model 1:
Yi = β0 + β1MandatoryRetirementi + β2Executivesi + β3BoardDiversityPolicyi +
β4WomenIndustryi + β5AverageBoardLengthi + β6LongestBoardLengthi + εi

Many of the variables included in this regression were chosen because they are policies
intentionally meant to achieve diverse boards. The remaining variables were chosen to reflect the
impact of longevity and the effect of diversity in other top leadership positions. The results of
Regression Model 1 are available in the Appendix.8 The number of female executives appear to
have the biggest impact on the number of female directors. A 1% point increase in female
executives results in a 26% point increase in the percentage of women serving on a board,
holding all else constant. Increasing female representation in other leadership positions is
therefore a priority for anyone wanting to increase female representation on boards. CEOs are
particularly important, given that 49% of CEOs serve on their company’s board (Spencer Stuart,
2017).
Certain industries also appear to correlate with more women on boards. As indicated in
Table 4.1, female dominated industries are retail, media, and hospitality. These three industries
have a statistically higher percentage of companies with high female representative boards and
therefore are included in the variable “women industry”. These industries are also traditionally
“feminized” in the sense that workers within these industries are more likely female. As
indicated in the regression results, female industries lead to a 5% point increase in the percentage
of women on their boards, holding all else constant. Restructuring societal beliefs on industries

8

All the coefficients are multiplied by 100 to accurately reflect totals.
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and gender stereotypes therefore has the potential to reduce the gender disparity seen among
different industries.
Longevity regarding board membership also appears to impact the likelihood of female
board membership. The variable “average board length” is the average number of years served
by all females currently on a company’s board. Interestingly, the coefficient on this variable is
negative, implying that as women serve on boards for more years, it becomes less likely for
female board membership to increase. However, the coefficient is extremely small, meaning that
as the number of years served on a board increases by one year, boards only experience a 1.6%
decrease in the number of female board members, holding all else constant. As a result, while the
variable is statistically significant, it is not of particular practical significance. Initially, I
hypothesized that boards with a longer history of female members would have greater gender
parity. However, this variable is flawed, potentially influencing the result. Measuring the average
number of years served by current female board members misses the women who previously
served on boards but have since stopped serving. Additionally, several companies with high
gender parity only recently increased the number of women on their boards. For most companies,
this increase was motivated in part from societal pressure. Tiffany & Co, for instance, received
negative media coverage in 2017 for their low gender parity (BOF, 2017). In just three years, the
company responded to their critics by having a board composed 50% of women. This cycle of
increasing female representation is becoming increasingly common among companies with high
media visibility, thereby influencing the impact of this variable. Length of time women have
served on a board does not positively impact the percentage of the women on the board today
largely because we have seen such recent increases in female representation on boards.
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“Longest board length” is another variable measuring longevity. Unlike the previous
variable, this variable only measures the longevity of the longest serving female board member.
This variable is meant to capture how long women have served on a company’s board. However,
the variable is flawed because it does not account for women who may have previously served
on the board but have since retired or quit. Although similar to the previous variable, the
coefficient on this variable is positive, albeit extremely small. This is likely because the variable
is not influenced by recent changes in society which have more dramatically increased the
percentage of women on boards. As the number of years served by a woman increases by one,
female board presence increases by 0.9%, holding all else constant. While the size of the impact
is small, this indicates that companies with a longer history of female board membership are
more likely to have gender equitable boards.
Mandatory retirement policies and board diversity policies are the only variables not
statistically significant.9 This suggests that company policies intended to increase board diversity
largely are not working. This finding is consistent with the summary statistics and may indicate
that many boards are trying to appear diverse even though they do not invoke any change. Many
companies therefore know that gender initiatives are appealing to costumers, thereby influencing
companies to appear diverse even when they are not ready to diversify their board members.
Model 2: Parental Leave
I also use parental leave as a dependent variable in my analysis. I chose this variable in
order to see how gender equitable policies and practices influence the generosity of a program
primarily benefiting women. Regression Model 2 is listed below. The dependent variable (Yi) is

9

In this analysis, statistical significance is defined as p<.05.
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the number of weeks of parental leave. Given that a substantial number of companies do not
explicitly reveal the number of weeks provided in their parental leave program, this variable is
limited to only 35 companies. As a result, this regression model is limited by the number of
observations available and we should be cautious about drawing strong inferences from this
model. The independent variables are the percentage of women on boards, the percentage of
executives, average board length, longest board length, and women industry. The independent
variables were chosen because they have the potential to impact parental leave policies but are
not explicitly related to board procedures. The results of Regression Model 2 are available in the
Appendix.

Regression Model 2:
Yi = β0 + β1WomenOnBoardi + β2Executivesi + β3AverageBoardLengthi +
β4LongestBoardLengthi + β5WomenIndustryi + εi

None of the coefficients on the independent variables are statistically significant. This is
likely a result of the small sample size, which limits the inferences that can be made about this
data. Although the regression does not produce statistically significant results, it is nevertheless
likely that some of these variables do influence parental leave generosity. Boards with more
women, for instance, may be more attune to the necessity of parental leave policies given that a
larger proportion of their board likely relied on parental leave. In our results, we see this variable
go in the hypothesized positive direction. This regression, however, cannot strongly demonstrate
such a relationship given data limitations.
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Model 3: Parent Friendly Policies
Parent friendly policies are the final dependent variable. Parent friendly policies are any
policy that benefits parents, excluding parental leave. Although related, parental leave and parent
friendly policies are different measurements. The dependent variable (P) is a dichotomous
variable indicating the presence of a parent friendly policy. This variable is very expansive in the
sense that there are several types of parent friendly policies, ranging from childcare services to
flexible work schedules. Ranking these policies in terms of generosity is therefore impossible,
meaning that this variable must be dichotomous. Although this means that the variable is less
precise, it allows for the inclusion of the entire database. A larger sample size is beneficial as it
may increase the statistical significance of the coefficients. The independent variables are the
percentage of women on boards, the percentage of female executives, average board length,
longest board length, and female dominated industry.
Parent friendly policies is a dichotomous variable, meaning that OLS regressions are not
suitable. A logistic regression is used instead, allowing for an analysis of the relationship
between the variables. Regression Model 3 is listed below and notably uses a different regression
equation than the previous two OLS regressions.

Regression Model 3:
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The results of Regression Model 3 are available in the Appendix. The only variable that
is statistically significant is the percentage of women on boards. However, coefficients in logit
regressions are not directly interpretable, meaning that the magnitude of the effect of this
variable is not directly observable by looking at the size of the coefficients. 10 Although the size
of the effect is not available, the coefficient does indicate that the relationship between parent
friendly policies and the presence of female board members is positive. This indicates that
female board members may advocate for parent friendly policies.
The percentage of female executives is another variable of interest. Although not
technically significant at the traditionally used measure for significance, the variable is
nevertheless interesting given its p-value nearly achieved statistical significance.11 The
coefficient on executives is positive, indicating a positive relationship between executives and
parent friendly policies. The remaining variables- average board length, longest board length,
and women industry- all have negative coefficients but none of these variables are statistically
significant, meaning that it is impossible to establish a directional relationship.
Overall Impact
Out of the three regression models, the first model is the most consequential for the
purpose of this analysis. Regression Model 1 shows the impact of numerous policies and
company practices on female board members. Policies purposely meant to increase female
representation, such as mandatory retirements and board diversity policies, largely are not

10

Calculating predicted probabilities are one way to discern the magnitude of the effect when using a logistic
regression. In this case, the predicted probabilities showed that the percentage of women on boards had a very
small effect on parent friendly policies. This relationship, although statistically significant, is likely very small. More
data is needed to accurately predict the size of this change.
11
The p-value for executives is 0.073.
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effective. However, the longevity of female board members, the number of female executives,
and the type of industry all significantly impact the presence of women on a company’s board.
Regression Models 2 and 3 almost entirely lack statistical significance. However, these models
largely suffer from limitations in the data and do not necessarily imply that parental leave and
parent friendly policies are not dependent on board practices or gender distributions. However,
given the data limitations, Regression Model 1 will largely shape the policy suggestions put
forward in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5:
Policy Suggestions
Gender quotas are an efficient way to achieve gender parity on boards, despite some
critics warning of their impact. However, regardless of any benefits derived from quotas,
political limitations make them largely unsuitable for the United States. Quotas are an expansive
policy that directly forces corporations to change how they govern their business. This
undermines the American ideal of a free market and will effectively prevent quotas from passing
in most states (Alstott, 2014). Instead, policies that indirectly and incrementally increase gender
equity are better suited for American government, as well as policy suggestions that are not
necessarily mandates. This means that there will not be a single policy that increases gender
parity but rather an amalgamation of several policies that will collectively help increase the
presence of female directors. These policies are best categorized as either government mandated
policies or corporate suggestions and are analyzed below.
Government Policy Suggestions
Social change in America often occurs from private initiatives rather than public policy
(Terjesen, 2009). Although passing policies can be challenging, once they are passed, they are
typically effective in bringing about change. This is because policies can be structured in a way
that punishes companies when they are not complying. There are several potential policies that
the government can enact to increase the number of female directors. Although quotas are
arguably not feasible, the government could pass paid parental leave, subsidize programs that
encourage women to pursue different types of industries, and/or require companies to implement
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a Rooney Rule. All these policies have already been effectively implemented in some capacity in
America, indicating their feasibility.
Parental Leave
Although parental leave is almost certainly linked to female directors, it is impossible to
establish the directional relationship between the two variables. Female directors may advocate
for parental leave policies or parental leave policies may help women advance to directorial
positions. Regardless of this relationship, it is important to foster parental leave policies given
the advantages they provide to many women. Numerous studies, for instance, find evidence that
parental leave lessens the childbearing pay gap by increasing labor force attachment for new
mothers (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). This is advantageous for working mothers and
reduces the hurtles that many women face in advancing in their career.
Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993, providing jobprotected leave for up to twelve weeks for a qualified family and medical reason. Pregnancy and
the adoption of children qualifies under the FMLA. However, the act does not provide paid
leave, meaning that many new families, especially mothers, face a financial burden when they
have children. As of January 2020, seven states and the District of Columbia have passed paid
leave policies to compensate new parents. Private companies can continue to offer their own
version of paid leave if it is at least as generous as the public program. Although many, if not
most, of the companies on the S&P 500 offer their own version of paid leave, it is nonetheless
crucial for a federal policy to pass. Most companies do not have the financial capability that the
companies on the S&P 500 have, meaning that a federal policy is still crucial for most
Americans.
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America is the only developed nation without a federal parental leave policy. While
parental leave was opposed by most Americans a few decades ago, public opinion has shifted,
and the policy is now largely favored by most Americans. In 2016, the Pew Research Center
found that 82% of Americans support paid maternity leave and 69% support paid paternity leave
(Pew Research Center, 2016). States are increasingly passing paid leave policies, with five states
passing a policy within the last five years. It is therefore becoming increasingly more likely that
Congress will pass a federal policy, especially given that both Democrat and Republican
lawmakers have proposed versions of the policy. President Trump has even expressed support
for the policy, though his administration has taken no substantive steps to achieve this.
Out of all the proposed policies, parental leave is arguably the most realistic for Congress
to pass. This is because the policy has a lot of support, from both citizens and lawmakers across
the aisle. Furthermore, seven states have already implemented the policy, which is typical in the
American system. Federalism encourages states to pass and essentially test new policies before a
federal policy is implemented. Given that states are increasingly realizing the benefits of a paid
leave policy, it seems likely that Congress will pass their own version within the next few years.
Rooney Rule
A Rooney Rule would also increase gender parity and would not impose an overly strict
requirement on companies. The Rooney Rule was originally made in response to the lack of
diversity among NFL coaches and requires that a team interview at least one minority candidate
for head managerial positions. If applied to corporate boards, a Rooney Rule would require that
at least some women are considered in the hiring process of new board candidates. This is less
formal than quotas and is therefore a more attractive policy for the government. Several
companies have already implemented this rule, with a relatively high level of success.
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Amazon attracted attention for passing a Rooney Rule in 2018, joining the ranks of
companies like Microsoft and Uber. Amazon was initially resistant to the rule, claiming that it
would artificially create the appearance of diversity (Johnson, 2018). However, the Rooney Rule
was eventually passed and in the two succeeding years women on Amazon’s board have
increased from 30% to 50%. Other companies have experienced similar increases, including the
NFL, which piloted the rule. Despite these successes, critics of the Rooney Rule claim that
companies can easily evade the rule by conducting sham interviews. Even if this were true, the
rule has additional advantages regardless of the chosen candidate. Underrepresented candidates,
for instance, gain valuable interviewing skills that can potentially help them get on a different
board (Van Der Zon, 2012). Additionally, the rule forces majority candidates to become more
competitive, ensuring that even if a majority candidate is chosen, he was not necessarily able to
rely solely on his name or connections (Van Der Zon, 2012).
Although the Rooney Rule has successfully increased gender diversity on many boards,
experts caution that the rule is more effective if it requires at least two women to be interviewed
for every board seat. Traditionally, the rule only requires one woman, but experts feel that if only
one woman is interviewed for a director position, she “stands out so much” that she has “no
chance of being hired” (Johnson, 2018). If two or more women are interviewed, however, it is
much more likely that a woman is hired for the position. This phenomenon is evident when
examining black hires in the NFL. If only one black candidate it interviewed, the chances of
hiring a black coach is 5%. However, if two black coaches are interviewed, the chances of hiring
a black coach increases to 33%. This is a major difference and indicates that the Rooney Rule is
most effective if it raises the minimum number of diverse candidates to at least two. Any policy
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on a Rooney Rule should therefore require at least two women interviewed for every new
directorial position.
Subsidized Programs for Male-Dominated Industries
The last policy for the government to implement regards the subsidization of programs
that encourage women to pursue traditionally “masculine” or male-dominated industries. The
regression model found that there is a strong correlation between the type of industry and the
number of female directors. “Feminine” industries- which are retail, media, and hospitality- are
linked to boards with more female directors. However, nothing about these industries is
inherently feminine nor is anything about masculine industries inherently masculine. Rather,
societal stereotypes and gender norms are influencing men and women to choose different career
paths. Changing the way society views industries may influence the gender composition of
boards, therefore giving both genders an equal chance to gain board seats.
Technology is traditionally considered one of the most male-dominated industries and is
therefore an excellent example to use. Women only make up 28% of the workforce in STEM
careers. For major technology companies, such as Google and Apple, it drops to 23% (NSB,
2018). It is therefore unsurprising that the technology sector lacks female leaders, given that their
candidacy pool for women is so small. Popular media often represents this gap to the public as
the result of women being less suited for a career in the STEM field than men. However,
numerous studies indicate that biological differences do not account for the gender disparity (Hill
et al, 2010). Rather, women face a negative stereotype regarding their ability in math and
science, which is shown to considerably lower their performance when they are young. This
mindset then discourages girls from pursing a STEM career, resulting in so few women in the
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technology sector. However, when girls are encouraged to pursue STEM, studies indicate that
they are just as successful as men.
Programs that encourage girls to pursue STEM careers are therefore crucial to breaking
down the industry’s gender disparity. Girls in Tech and Women Who Code are two of the several
programs that nationally encourage women to purse and subsequently excel in the STEM field. If
these programs were expanded, the gender stereotype surrounding the technology industry would
eventually disappear and more women would subsequently rise to leadership roles within the
industry. Similar programs should be implemented for every male-dominated industry, including
construction, finance, and energy. The government should therefore subsidize these programs,
thereby showing a commitment to reducing the gender disparity of boards.
Tax Incentives
Compared to quotas, the aforementioned policies are less restrictive to the American
ideal of a free market. Although this makes them more likely to pass, it does not guarantee their
implementation. However, if designed with sensitivity to American institutions, the policies may
pass comfortably. Tax incentives are used cleverly in the United States to pass social policies
without appearing to infringe on the free market. For policies that have a hard time passing, tax
incentives may be a better avenue to pursue instead of the traditional policy path.
Most Americans operate under the assumption that the market is better than the
government for structuring businesses. This has halted the creation of policies that overtly
regulate the business sector, such as corporate quotas. However, the United States still regulates
businesses but does so discretely using the tax system. Tax incentives and penalties are used
extensively in the United States because they “preserve the appearance of voluntarism” (Alstott,
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2014). Technically, taxes do not force companies to act in a certain way. They only provide
monetary incentives, which are largely effective in shaping the decisions of businesses.
Although in practice taxes regulate businesses, they largely are not opposed. This is
because tax law is so technical that most citizens are unaware that the government uses taxes to
achieve policy objectives. For instance, the federal government provides tax incentives to
companies that use alternative fuels and solar polar to improve global warming (Alstott, 2014).
The government has also punished corporate decisions that they deem harmful, such as illegal
bribes and kickbacks. Although most Americans are ignorant of business-focused tax incentives,
the business sector is acutely aware and responsive to changes in the tax law. Most businesses
optimize on tax incentives, making these incentives largely successful in shaping business
decisions.
If any of the previously mentioned policies face resistance, tax incentives are therefore a
viable path forward. Firms cannot avoid paying federal taxes. Furthermore, federal taxes apply to
the entire country, meaning that companies cannot move to a different state to avoid paying
them. However, there is a large variation in the technicalities regarding tax incentives, just as
there is a large variation in the number of policy objectives that the government can aim to
achieve. Regardless of these variations, tax incentives allow for the government to achieve their
policy goals without facing the traditional policy resistance.
Corporate Policy Suggestions
Although the government can ensure the enforcement of policies through strict penalties
or monetary incentives, some policies are not always feasible for the government to pass. Several
policies are best left as suggestions given their novelty or their structure. These policies are less
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desired since they are not enforceable but nevertheless represent ways for corporations to
increase gender parity in the interim. These suggestions include mentoring programs, term limits,
and informal quotas.
Mentoring Programs
Mentoring programs are among the most visible programs that companies use to expand
female leadership. These programs are essential because it is hard to increase female leadership
at the top without creating programs that support women throughout their career journey.
However, it is not entirely certain if female leaders in non-directorial positions increase the
presence of female directors or if the direction is in the opposite way. Likely, however, the
relationship is multi-directional. For instance, more female executives likely increase the number
of female directors which in turn increases the number of female executives. Regression Model 1
indicates that female executives and female directors correlate, meaning programs that encourage
female executives warrant merit.
Mentoring programs are used widely among companies to increase female leadership.
However, these programs are highly specific to each company, meaning that it is hard to impose
a federal policy that works for every corporation. Nevertheless, corporate-initiated programs are
shown to successfully increase female leadership by exposing women at low-levels positions to
women at high-level positions. This is beneficial because the existing underrepresentation of
women in leadership positions sustains the perception that attaining leadership is hard for
women. This creates a mental barrier for women and creates disincentives for many women from
trying to advance in their career. However, this barrier is broken when women are exposed to
other women who have attained top leadership roles. The lower-level women become “inspired”
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by the “huge milestones” taken by the women at the top, enabling these women to visualize their
own success (Terjesen, 2009).
Unsurprisingly, numerous studies indicate that exposure to top female leaders is shown to
have a positive influence on expanding the representation of women in leadership positions
(Kurtulus, 2011; Wang, 2013). In addition to destigmatizing female leadership, mentoring
programs achieve success by giving women exposure to networking opportunities. Access to
top-ranking executives is a major benefit to anyone wanting to advance in their career.
Relationships formed through mentoring programs therefore expose women to the potential for
career advancements.
Companies should therefore form mentoring programs to expand the potential for female
leaders. To achieve success, companies should allocate the proper resources and funding to
women-specific mentoring programs. In addition to fostering relationships between women, the
programs also should host events and workshops to help women gain the leadership skills
necessary to advance in their careers. Any company that wants to increase the gender diversity of
their leaders should seriously consider implementing a mentoring program.
Term Limits and Retirement Policies
Many companies implement retirement policies and term limits, but their effectiveness is
disputed. These policies are meant to reduce the amount of time that directors serve on a board,
thereby reducing the number of white men that traditionally occupy board seats. In theory, this
opens the potential to hire new and diverse directors. However, these policies are not associated
with gender equitable boards. The results from Regression Model 1 reveal that the presence of a
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retirement policy is not linked in any meaningful way to the presence of female directors. There
was not enough data on term limits to establish a link.
Retirement policies are therefore not an effective policy solution. However, this may be
because of the way the policy is set up. Among companies with a retirement policy, 51% require
directors to retire before the age of 75, while 49% have a retirement age of 75 or older. The
average retirement age is 73, which is considerably older than Social Security’s retirement age of
66. Many companies even allow for directors to serve beyond the retirement age under special
circumstances. Given that the average age of a new director is 55 (Spencer Stuart, 2017), it is
plausible that many directors serve over 20 years on a board. This effectively negates the purpose
of retirement policies, which is to limit the number of years that directors serve.
Unlike retirement policies, term limits may effectively reduce the number of years that
directors serve. This is because companies can ensure that directors only serve on a board for a
short time by implementing a term limit of only a few years. Properly used term limits are
therefore much more effective than retirement policies at increasing turnover. This may increase
the chances for new and diverse directors to join boards, potentially increasing the gender parity
of the boards. However, given that only 5% of the companies in the database require term limits,
it is impossible to establish any directional link through regressions. However, term limits are
still a notable policy given that of the few companies to require term limits, none of these
companies had boards with low-female representation. This is especially notable, given that most
of the term limits were in the range of 12 to 15 years. Although 12 to 15 years is lower than the
estimated 20 years served by directors in companies without term limits, it is still a long time for
any single director to serve. Therefore, term limits may become even more effective at increasing
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gender parity if they were lowered to 5 to 8 years. This would effectively drive up the turnover
rate of boards, thereby increasing the chances boards have to add women.
Informal Quotas
For companies that are serious about adding women to their boards, quotas are still the
most effective policy solution. Although quotas are largely infeasible on a state-wide or federal
level, nothing prevents companies from implementing their own quota. This is arguably the best
way for companies to signal their commitment to gender parity. Corporate-initiated quotas are
therefore a policy recommendation but should not be enforced through any legal means.
Many companies currently signal their commitment to gender parity through diversity
statements related to their board. Most companies (74%) have some form of diversity statement,
which typically indicates that they consider gender as a favorable characteristic when they hire
new board members. However, diversity statements are largely ineffective as indicated in
Regression Model 1. There is no link between diversity statements and female directors,
indicating that these statements are overly vague and lack the enforcement required to
substantially increase female directors. Quotas, however, are specific commitments that
corporations make, ensuring that gender parity is achieved. Although company quotas are
entirely feasible, none of the corporations in the database have implemented them. Companies
therefore still appear resistant to formal diversity requirements, even if they are the ones to
impose them. This indicates that formal policies are still the most effective.
Political Activism
Although policy recommendations and corporate suggestions are a formal avenue of
eliciting change, sometimes the problem is best solved outside of the policy sphere. While the
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aforementioned policies will increase gender parity, they will do so incrementally. Arguably a
faster way to provoke change is through political activism. However, this does not mean that
policies are useless or that nothing should be done about increasing gender parity. Rather,
political activism should be used in conjunction with the policies to bring about change even
faster.
Political activism is a conscious effort to promote change regarding a specific problem in
society. Political activism can take many forms and includes activities such a protests and letter
campaigns. When these activities are done in a productive manner, it can increase media
attention and hopefully shame companies into changing their board composition. The Me Too
Movement is an example of political activism that has specifically brought attention to women’s
rights. As a result, several companies have received negative media attention in the last few
years regarding the gender composition of their boards. Facebook and Amazon are two of the
most prominent companies to have received this negative attention, resulting in both companies
adding more female directors.12
The entire purpose of political activism is to shame companies into changing. Gender
equality is a popular position in society, with most (59%) Americans feeling that there are not
enough women in top executive business positions (Horowitz, 2018). When gender board
disparities are exposed, consumers therefore become angry, potentially impacting the revenue of
the company. To mitigate the negative backlash, companies are motivated to quickly add more
female directors, as was done in Facebook and Amazon.

12

In March 2020, Facebook doubled the number of women on their board in response to negative media
attention. However, this change is not reflected in the database given that it occurred after the compilation of the
database.
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Political activism therefore has the potential to bring about fast change, though policies
are still needed to ensure that the change is sustainable. The changes that occur from political
activism happen fast but do not necessarily mean that the company is committed to gender
equality. Rather, the company is overly concerned with their profit and image, resulting in more
female directors. The policies previously mentioned are slower and more deliberate, meaning
that they help change the culture around gender and board composition. As such, political
activism is helpful in the short-term for increasing gender equity but should be used in
conjunction with policies to ensure a lasting increase in gender equitable boards.
Policy Summary
Given the infeasibility of gender quotas, alterative policies are needed. Policies that
indirectly increase gender equity are better suited for American politics as well as policy
suggestions that are not mandates. The government should initiate parental leave, a Rooney Rule,
and subsidize programs for male-dominated industries. If these policies face resistance, the
government could implement them through the form of tax incentives. Policies that will face the
most opposition but are nevertheless beneficial are mentoring programs, term limits, and
informal quotas. These policies are suggested for companies that want to independently achieve
gender parity at a fast rate.
Although the policies I have suggested are arguably less efficient than gender quotas,
most of them are feasible in the context of American politics. It is better to have a policy that is
less efficient but is feasible rather than have no policy at all. Gender quotas may still be the goal
in the long term, but until that point is reached these policies are realistic substitutions.
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Conclusion
American society has largely grown to favor gender equitable boards, yet most
companies do not make it a priority. This has resulted in the slow growth of female directors,
making it essential for the government to enact a policy. Corporate quotas are used abroad and in
California, but political limitations make them likely infeasible for the majority of America. Few
other policies garner much consideration. This thesis focused on alternative policies and
compiled a unique database to assess the options. A mix of policies that indirectly increase
gender parity are found to be better suited for American government. Parental leave, a Rooney
Rule, and subsidized programs for male-dominated industries are policies with increasing
popularity that are linked to the increase of female directors. These policies will face less
resistance than quotas because they allow the business sector to preserve the appearance of free
choice. They will increase gender parity, albeit at a slower rate than quotas. However, given that
quotas are not realistic, the government should focus on passing policies that are less effective
but more feasible.
Although quotas are not a suitable government policy, companies that are committed to
increasing gender parity could still implement their own version of a quota. Term limits and
mentoring programs are also alternative policies that companies can privately implement. These
policies are less restrictive than quotas but arguably too restrictive for the government to pass.
However, bypassing traditional policies may prove to be the most effective solution. Tax
incentives cleverly allow for the government to achieve their policy aims while preserving the
appearance of voluntarism. Political activism should also be used in conjunction with any of the
proposed policy solutions, as it brings about public awareness of the issue.
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Future research should also focus on alternative types of diversity. Racial minorities,
veterans, the disabled, and members of the LGBTQ community face similar obstacles in
achieving representation. For instance, in 2018, racial minorities- both men and women- made up
only 16% of board seats on Fortune 500 companies (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018). For
comparison, women made up 23%. Additionally, future research should utilize a larger database
and include more variables, both of which I was not able to do because of time restraints. For
instance, I would have preferred to include every company in the S&P 500 and as well as include
variables that tracked men for comparative purposes.
Achieving gender parity on boards is a seemingly straightforward goal but has complex
solutions. There is not a single policy that is both entirely effective and feasible. However,
instituting a mix of the proposed policies will encourage boards to add more female directors.
Women’s voices have gone unheard for too long in corporate America. It is time for that to
change.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Codebook of Database

Mandatory
Retirement

Term Limit

0=No mandatory
retirement
1=Mandatory
retirement

Parent
Friendly
Policy

0=No term
limit

0=No parent
friendly policy

1=Term limit

1=Parent
friendly policy

Board
Diversity
Policy
0=No board
diversity
policy
1=Board
diversity
policy

Table A.2: Detailed Breakdown of Industry Type

Industry Type
1=Finance
Includes banks, loans, insurance
2=Retail
3= Real Estate
4=Technology
5= Energy and Mining
6=Hospitality
Includes restaurants, hotels, cruises
7=Manufacturing
Includes building of transportation, production of goods
8=Media
9=Construction
10=Health
Includes medical products, healthcare, pharmaceuticals
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Industry Type

1=Finance

2=Retail
3= Real Estate
4=Technology
5= Energy &
Mining
6=Hospitality
7=Manufacturing
8=Media
9=Construction
10=Health

Table A.3: Database of 100 Random Companies on the S&P 50013

13

A more detailed database is available upon request.
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Table A.3: Continued
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Table A.3: Continued
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Table A.3: Continued

90

Table A.3: Continued
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Table A.4: Companies Classified by their Parental Leave Policy
N/A Policy

6 Weeks & Below

7-12 Weeks

13 Weeks & Up

Capri

Zebra Technologies

Tegna

Invesco

Navient
Arista Networks

Walmart
Illumina Inc.

Fifth Third Bank
American Airlines

Amazon
General Mills

Chipotle

Mondelez
International

Tapestry

Visa

O'Reilly Automotive
Inc.

Waters Corporation

Danaher Corporation

Hologic

Leidos Holdings Inc.

Xylem Inc.

F5 Networks Inc.

Facebook

General Motors

Teleflex Incorporated

FleetCor Technologies Inc.

Flowserve

EOG Resources
Inc.
DaVita Inc.

Humana Inc.

DXC Technology Co.

Unum Group

Hilton Worldwide
Holdings Inc
First Republic Bank

Exelon Corporation

Eversource Energy

Duke Energy

Southern Company

Truist Financial Corporation

Dish Network

Whirlpool
Corporation

Tiffany & Co.

D.R. Horton Inc.

Campbell Soup
Company

Accenture Plc

TJX Companies

Host Hotels &
Resorts Inc.

Ebay

Mohawk Industries
Inc.

Equinix Inc.

Mid-America
Apartment
Communities
ViacomCBS Inc.
Norwegian Cruise
Line Holdings
Ameren Corporation
Ameriprise Financial
Inc.
Duke Realty
Corporation
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Table A.4: Continued
N/A Policy

N/A Policy

N/A Policy

N/A Policy

Lockheed Martin
Corporation

Ingersoll-Rand Plc

Fastenal Company

Assurant Inc.

Freeport-McMoRan
Inc.

International Paper
Company

W. R. Berkley
Corporation

Cincinnati Financial
Corporation

Henry Schein Inc.

Western Digital
Corporation

Avery Dennison
Corporation

IPG Photonics Corporation

NRG Energy Inc.

Carnival
Corporation

Federal Realty
Investment Trust

LyondellBasell Industries

PulteGroup Inc.

CDW Corp.

National Oilwell
Varco Inc.

HP Inc.

Citizens Financial

American Electric
Power Company
Inc.
Xilinx Inc.

Merck & Co. Inc.

Varian Medical Systems
Inc.

A. O. Smith
Corporation
Snap-on Incorporated

Advanced Micro Devices
Inc.
Xerox Holdings
Corporation
Monster Beverage

Linde
STERIS Plc
Newmont Corporation

Atmos Energy
Corporation
WEC Energy
Group Inc

Tractor Supply
Company

Arthur J. Gallagher &
Co.

Intuitive Surgical
Inc.

PPL Corporation

Hess Corporation

Genuine Parts
Company

Royal Caribbean
Cruises
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SL Green Realty Corp.

Table A.5: Regression Model 1 (Yi = Women on Boards)

Table A.6: Regression Model 2 (Yi = Parental Leave)
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Table A.7: Regression Model 3 (P=Parent Friendly Policy)
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